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CODE REVISION COMMISSION V.
PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG AND THE FIGHT
OVER COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR
ANNOTATIONS AND COMMENTARY
David E. Shipley
This Article analyzes Code Revision Commission
v. Public.Resource.Org, a 2018 decision in which the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit applied
the public edicts doctrine and held that Georgia’s
copyright on the annotations, commentary, and
analyses in the Official Code of Georgia Annotated is
invalid. The U.S. Supreme Court granted Georgia’s
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari on June 24, 2019.
About a third of states claim copyright in the
annotations to their codes, so the potential impact of
this decision is substantial.
This Article’s thesis is that the Eleventh Circuit
was wrong and should be reversed. It first discusses
the code revision process in Georgia and the
Public.Resource.Org litigation. It next analyzes the
Eleventh Circuit’s three independent but related
reasons for concluding that the annotations are
law-like: (1) the identity of the public officials who
created the work; (2) the authoritativeness of the work;
and (3) the process for creating the work. This analysis
is followed by a discussion of the merger doctrine, a
discussion of the use of the term ‘merger’ in O.C.G.A.
§ 1-1-1, and a brief summary of Supremacy Clause
concerns. This Article concludes that the Eleventh
Circuit should be reversed by the United States
Supreme Court.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Edicts of government, such as federal and state judicial opinions,
statutes, and ordinances, are in the public domain and not subject
to
copyright
ownership.1
Due
process
requires
that
“citizens . . . have free access to the laws which govern them.”2
Accordingly, “the law, whether in court opinions or statutes, cannot
be reduced to property through copyright, whether by individuals or
by the government itself.”3 These principles explain why the
Copyright Office refuses to register government edicts, “including
legislative enactments, judicial decisions, administrative rulings,
public ordinances, or similar types of official legal materials.”4 At
the same time, headnotes, annotations, case summaries, and other
matters added by publishers are protectable,5 and the Copyright
Office may register such annotations unless they “themselves have
the force of law.”6 In addition, the Copyright Act extends copyright
protection to derivative works7—that is, “work[s] consisting of
editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications
which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship.”8
1 CRAIG JOYCE, TYLER OCHOA, MICHAEL CARROLL, MARSHALL LEAFFER & PETER JASZI,
COPYRIGHT LAW 131, 249 n.10 (10th ed. 2016) [hereinafter JOYCE ET AL.] (“It has been
generally recognized . . . that . . . cases themselves are not subject to copyright protection.”).
The public domain status for judicial opinions and statutes is called the “edicts of
government” doctrine. Brief of Amici Curiae 119 Law Students, 54 Solo and Small-Firm
Practitioners of Law, and 21 Legal Educators in Support of Respondent at 2, Georgia v.
Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 2746 (2019) (No. 18-1150), 2019 WL 2121377, at *2;
Leslie A. Street & David R. Hansen, Who Owns the Law? Why We Must Restore Public
Ownership of Legal Publishing, 26 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 205, 222 (2019).
2 Georgia v. Harrison Co., 548 F. Supp. 110, 114 (N.D. Ga. 1982); see also Nash v. Lathrop,
6 N.E. 559, 560 (Mass. 1886) (explaining that justice requires free access to judicial opinions
and statutes because citizens are “presumed to know the law”).
3 L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright
Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L. REV. 719, 723 (1989).
4 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES
§ 313.6(C)(2) (3d ed. 2017) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT OFFICE COMPENDIUM]; see also 17 U.S.C.
§ 105 (2012) (excluding from copyright eligibility any work of the U.S. government).
5 See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 1, at 249 n.10; Code Revision Comm’n v.
Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th Cir. 2018) (stating that “all agree that
annotations created by a private party generally can be copyrighted because the annotations
are an original work created by a private publisher”), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 2746 (June 24,
2019) (No. 18-1150).
6 COPYRIGHT OFFICE COMPENDIUM, supra note 4, § 313.6(C)(2).
7 See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (providing copyright in a derivative work “only to the material
contributed by the author . . . as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the
work”).
8 Id. § 101 (emphasis added).
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This dichotomy between the public domain status of judicial
opinions and statutes and the copyrightability of annotations and
commentary seemed fairly well-settled9 until 2018 when the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided Code
Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc.10 The Official
Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.), currently produced by
LexisNexis, includes research tools like annotations and legislative
history along with Georgia’s uncopyrightable statutes,11 and the
Eleventh Circuit held that this annotated version of the Official
Code of Georgia is public domain material that cannot be
copyrighted by Georgia.12 Notwithstanding clear statements by the
Georgia General Assembly that these annotations and summaries
are not part of the law,13 the Eleventh Circuit opined that the
annotations are law-like and are unprotectable by copyright
because they are “an exercise of sovereign power.”14 Georgia sought
review, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on
June 24, 2019.15

9 All parties to the Public.Resource.Org litigation and amici assert that there is “confusion
and perceived inconsistency” surrounding the scope of the government edicts doctrine such
that “outcomes are difficult to predict.” See Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 1–2, in Georgia
v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 2746 (2019) (No. 18-1150), 2019 WL 2297303, at *1–
*2 [hereinafter Petitioners’ Reply Brief] (internal quotations omitted). This Article asserts
that the distinction between annotations and statutes/judicial opinions is in fact
well-established but agrees that there is uncertainty and inconsistency surrounding the
availability of copyright protection for privately drafted codes and standards which have been
adopted by, incorporated in, or referenced in statutes and ordinances. See infra notes 77–108
and accompanying text.
10 906 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2018).
11 Street & Hansen, supra note 1, at 223–24.
12 Public.Resource.Org, 906 F.3d. at 1232.
13 See id. at 1233–34; see also infra notes 52–58 and accompanying text.
14 Public.Resource.Org, 906 F.3d at 1232–33, 1243. The court acknowledged that the
annotations lacked the force of law. Id. at 1233.
15 Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 2746 (June 24, 2019) (No. 18-1150).
Public.Resource.Org and several amica supported the petition for certiorari filed by the Code
Revision Commission. See Adam Liptak, Accused of ‘Terrorism’ for Putting Legal Materials
Online, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/13/us/politics/georgiaofficial-code-copyright.html (“[I]n an unusual move, . . . Public.Resource.Org[] also urged the
court to hear the dispute, saying that the question of who owns the law is an urgent one . . . .”);
Kyle Jahner, Firms, Lawyers, States Want High Court to Weigh in on Annotations,
BLOOMBERG L. NEWS (May 30, 2019, 4:46 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/firmslawyers-states-want-high-court-to-weigh-in-on-annotations (noting that “[n]early 200 law
students, solo practitioners, and legal educators” submitted a brief in support of
Public.Resource.Org while “[t]hirteen associations, nonprofits[,] and coalitions . . . urged the
justices to take the case, but stopped short of picking a side”).
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The ramifications of this ruling are substantial. The Eleventh
Circuit eviscerated an established distinction in the edicts of
government doctrine and arguably invalidated the copyright in
official annotated state codes nationwide.16 The decision also
undermines the copyright incentive for states to contract with
third-party publishers to prepare the annotations, analyses, and
commentary about the unprotectable statutory provisions in their
codes. This is because the revenue third-party publishers currently
receive from the sale of codes will dry up if entities like
Public.Resource.Org (PRO) can freely copy a code’s annotations and
commentary in addition to the code’s unprotected statutory
portions.17 And “[w]ithout sales of copyright-protected annotated
codes, companies like Lexis[Nexis] also would not agree to publish
unannotated statutes for free online.”18
This Article argues that the Eleventh Circuit, which has been
aggressive in applying Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co.19 to restrict the scope of copyright protection for
directories, taxonomies, catalogs, and other low authorship works,20
got it wrong in Public.Resource.Org and should be reversed. It went
too far by constructively repealing several provisions in the Georgia

16 See Petitioners’ Reply Brief, supra note 9, at 11 (“About one-third of states claim
copyright in annotations to their statutes.”); Brief of the States of Arkansas, Alabama, Idaho,
Kansas, Mississippi, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Tennessee as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 4, in Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 2746 (2019)
(No. 18-1150), 2019 WL 1532020, at *4 [hereinafter Brief of the States] (noting that “[t]he
annotations in the official annotated codes of twenty-two [s]tates . . . , two territories, and the
District of Columbia are copyrighted” and possess similar “characteristics of the annotations
in Georgia”); Kyle Jahner, Justices to Decide Whether States Can Copyright Annotated Laws,
BLOOMBERG
L.
NEWS
(June
24,
2019,
9:34
AM),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/XDGS00QG000000?bna_news_filter=iplaw&jcsearch=BNA%25200000016b515ed16ca5ff7ddf09da0003#jcite (discussing the case’s
potential effect on states who have similar agreements with Westlaw or LexisNexis).
17 Brief of the States, supra note 16, at 10–11; but see Eric E. Johnson, The Misadventure
of Copyrighting State Law, 107 KY. L.J. 593, 601–07 (2018) (criticizing the efforts of several
states, including Georgia, to assert copyright in the codes).
18 Petitioners’ Reply Brief, supra note 9, at 11; but see Derek E. Bambauer, Paths or
Fences: Patents, Copyrights, and the Constitution, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1017, 1073–77 (2019)
(discussing some of the problems with copyright protection for state legislative materials,
including Georgia’s claim of protection for the Code’s annotations).
19 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
20 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 1, at 249 n.11; see generally David Shipley, Thin but Not
Anorexic: Copyright Protection for Compilations and Other Fact Works, 15 J. INTELL. PROP.
L. 91, 98–130 (2007) (discussing Eleventh Circuit’s application of Feist).
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Code and disregarding established precedent.21 Instead, the
copyright infringement claim against PRO should have been
squarely resolved in Georgia’s favor. The state’s infringement claim
against PRO does not fit within the seemingly inconsistent, hard to
reconcile cases involving privately drafted codes and standards that
are made part of, or referenced in, a statute or ordinance enacted by
a governmental entity.22 Moreover, the Georgia legislature clearly
distinguished its unprotectable public domain statutes from the
Code’s copyrightable commentary and annotations when the Code
was first revised almost forty years ago.23 The U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia stated that “[t]he entire
O.C.G.A. is not enacted into law by the Georgia legislature and does
not have the force of law.”24 It emphasized that the Georgia General
Assembly had passed three different statutes that unequivocally
indicate “that the O.C.G.A. contains both law and commentary,”
thereby distinguishing unprotected statutory material from
copyrightable annotations and commentary.25
By ruling against Georgia in its copyright infringement claim
against PRO, the Eleventh Circuit tossed aside these distinctions.
The fundamental question to be resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court
is whether the government edicts doctrine should encompass
creative works in a code, such as annotations and commentary, that

21 The U.S. Supreme Court has previously held “that the reporter of a volume of law
reports can obtain a copyright for it as an author.” Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 650
(1888). Ten years later, the Sixth Circuit, relying on Callaghan, upheld the copyrightability
of annotations in a government-approved publication of Michigan’s statutes. See Howell v.
Miller, 91 F. 129, 138 (6th Cir. 1898).
22 See Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d 1229, 1238–39 (11th
Cir. 2018) (explaining how lower courts have applied Callaghan and reached inconsistent
results); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, in Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 139 S.
Ct. 2746 (2019) (No. 18-1150) [hereinafter Georgia’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari]
(describing “the lower courts’ considerable confusion regarding the government edicts
doctrine”); see also infra notes 77–108 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 52–58 and accompanying text.
24 Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d 1352, 1356 (N.D.
Ga. 2017).
25 Id. at 1356–57. Additionally, the publication agreement between Georgia and
LexisNexis provides that Georgia’s “copyrights shall cover all copyrightable parts of the
Code.” Public.Resource.Org, 906 F.3d at 1233–34. But see generally Christina M. Frohock,
The Law as Uncopyrightable: Merging Idea and Expression Within the Eleventh Circuit’s
Analysis of “Law-Like” Writing, 73 MIAMI L. REV. 1269 (2019) (writing in support of the
Eleventh Circuit’s decision and suggesting that the same result can be reached through a
merger doctrine argument).
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are acknowledged to lack the force of law.26 This Article, in
explaining why the Eleventh Circuit incorrectly concluded that the
government edicts doctrine covers the O.C.G.A.’s annotations and
commentary, first discusses the code revision process in Georgia
and the Public.Resource.Org litigation. Next, this Article analyzes
the Eleventh Circuit’s reasons for concluding that the annotations
are law-like: (1) the identity of the public officials who created the
work; (2) the authoritativeness of the work; and (3) the process for
creating the work. This analysis is followed by a discussion of the
merger doctrine, the use of the term “merger” in O.C.G.A. § 1-1-1,
and a brief summary of Supremacy Clause concerns. This Article
ultimately concludes that the Supreme Court should reverse the
Eleventh Circuit.
II. CODE REVISION IN GEORGIA
In 1976, “the Georgia General Assembly . . . created the Code
Revision Study Committee to study the need for a recodification of
the Georgia code.”27 This committee concluded that there should be
an official publication of the Code and recommended that this
publication be controlled by the state.28 The legislature then created
the Code Revision Commission, authorizing it to carry out several
tasks, including contracting with a publisher to revise the 1933
Code and the state’s subsequently enacted laws.29 For several
Georgia’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 22, at I.
Georgia v. Harrison Co., 548 F. Supp. 110, 112 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
28 Id.; Elizabeth Holland, Will You Have to Pay for the O.C.G.A.?: Copyrighting the Official
Code of Georgia Annotated, 26 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 99, 109–115 (2019) (noting that “[t]he
[Georgia] legislators wanted control over the annotations to ensure that the explanations of
the law reflected what the General Assembly . . . actually meant”).
29 Under O.C.G.A. § 28-9-3 (2019), the Code Revision Commission is authorized
(9) [t]o prepare, or provide for the preparation of, and to include in the Code
such annotations, historical notes, research references, notes on law review
articles, cross-references, summaries of the opinions of the Attorney General
of Georgia, editor's notes, Code Revision Commission notes, comments,
commentaries, rules and regulations, indexes, tables, and other material as
the commission determines to be useful to users of the Code;
(10) [t]o provide for the publication of annotated or unannotated versions of
the Code, or both;
(11) [t]o provide for the publication of volumes containing the Constitution of
the United States, the Constitution of the State of Georgia, and an index of
local and special laws, general laws of local application, and home rule
ordinances; [and]
....
26
27
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decades the Harrison Company published unofficial versions of the
1933 codification under various titles, including “Code of Georgia
Annotated,” “Georgia Code Annotated,” and “Georgia Code
Unannotated.”30
After hearing presentations from five law publishers, including
Harrison, the Code Revision Commission entered into a ten-year
contract with the Michie Company “to codify, revise, index, print,
bind, and deliver according to the directions of the Commission 500
sets of a revised and recodified code of Georgia, which was to be
designated as the ‘Official Code of Georgia Annotated.’”31 The
enabling legislation and the contract treated the Code as a “work
made for hire” under the Copyright Act32 and vested ownership of
the copyright with the state.33 “The Commission itself developed the
uniform numbering system and rules of style used in the
new . . . Code,” and when the editorial process was completed, a
manuscript—the Code of Georgia 1981 Legislative Edition—was
presented to and enacted by the General Assembly.34 Annotations,
indexes, and other notes and materials then were added to the
manuscript to produce Georgia’s first official Code since 1933—the
O.C.G.A.35
Lawyers serving in the General Assembly at this time were
strongly in favor of having an annotated code with “explanations to
the statutory provisions [that] interpret judicial opinions, attorney
general guidance documents, and law review and journal articles
that relate to the statute.”36 They felt that annotations helped

(15) To register the copyright claim in all materials in the Code and any
supplements thereto, to protect, enforce, and preserve all claims in such
materials, to bring and defend actions in any court in connection therewith,
and to negotiate and grant licenses or rights, on behalf of the state, to use
such material upon such terms and conditions as the commission shall
determine to be in the best interest of the state . . . .
30 Harrison Co., 548 F. Supp. at 112.
31 Id.
32 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “work made for hire”).
33 Harrison Co., 548 F. Supp. at 112; see also 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012) (providing that the
employer for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of the
Copyright Act and is deemed owner of the copyright).
34 Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d 1352, 1353 (N.D.
Ga. 2017).
35 Id.
36 Holland, supra note 28, at 111.
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lawyers understand how to apply the law.37 In fact, this intent is
reflected in the enabling legislation itself because it provides broad
discretion to include any material deemed “to be useful to users of
the Code.”38 Michie’s version of the new Code as annotated
consequently had the imprimatur of the state, and attorneys who
cited unofficial versions of the Code “d[id] so at their peril” because
the Michie version controlled.39
In 2006 the Commission requested proposals from interested
publishers and subsequently entered into a new agreement with
Matthew Bender & Co., a division of LexisNexis.40 As in the prior
agreement with Michie, the official Code is required to include
“statutory text and non-statutory annotation text, including judicial
decision summaries, editor’s notes, research references, notes on
law review articles, summaries of the opinions of the Attorney
General of Georgia, indexes, and title, chapter, article, part, and
subpart captions.”41
LexisNexis is also required to summarize “all published opinions
of the Georgia Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals of Georgia,
and all published opinions of the United States Supreme Court and
other federal courts that arose in Georgia and construed Georgia’s
general statutes.”42 Finally, the agreement requires LexisNexis “to
provide appropriate copyright notice on both the free public website
and the online O.C.G.A. available as part of [its] for-profit online
services and to notify visitors that any reproduction of the O.C.G.A.
other than the statutory text and numbering [was] prohibited.”43 In
essence, “[t]he Commission asserts a copyright in all portions of the

37 See id. (quoting an attorney’s belief that “[y]ou really need an annotated Code to practice
law”); Liptak, supra note 15 (“Only a very bad lawyer would fail to consult [the annotations]
in determining the meaning of a statute.”). In addition, the lawyer-legislators did not want
practitioners to have to buy two versions of the Code—the official version and an unofficial
annotated version. See Holland, supra note 28, at 111.
38 O.C.G.A. § 28-9-3(9) (2019).
39 Georgia v. Harrison Co., 548 F. Supp. 110, 117 (N.D. Ga. 1982); see also Johnson, supra
note 17, at 602–03 (discussing Georgia v. Harrison Co. and noting that the court “held that
states were, like everyone else, unentitled to copyright over law”).
40 Public.Resource.Org, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 1353.
41 Id. The court noted that all of these materials were prepared by LexisNexis under the
terms of the agreement. Id.
42 Id. (internal quotation omitted).
43 Id. at 1354; see also Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc. 906 F.3d 1229,
1234 (11th Cir. 2018).
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[Code] except for the statutory text, which it recognizes cannot be
copyrighted.”44
III. THE LITIGATION—CODE REVISION COMMISSION V.
PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG
This copyright infringement litigation was instigated after
defendant PRO purchased, scanned, and uploaded to its website an
entire print edition of the O.C.G.A. and its supplements, making it
freely accessible to the public.45 “It also placed digital copies of the
[O.C.G.A.] onto USB drives and [distributed] them to various
Georgia legislators” and other organizations.46 The Code Revision
Commission demanded that PRO stop publishing the O.C.G.A.
because this infringed Georgia’s copyright.47 PRO, however,
refused, arguing that the O.C.G.A. could not be copyrighted.48
The Code Revision Commission sued PRO for copyright
infringement, seeking “injunctive relief and removal of infringing
materials from the Internet.”49 The United States District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia “acknowledge[d] that this [was] an
unusual case because most official codes are not annotated and most
annotated codes are not official.”50 Even so, it concluded that the
annotations in the O.C.G.A. lacked the force of law, were not in the
public domain, and were protected by the state’s copyright.51
The Eleventh Circuit reversed. It acknowledged that the Code
itself specifically states that the annotations and commentaries are

44 Public.Resource.Org, 906 F.3d at 1234. (“The publication agreement also provides that
‘[a]ll the contents of the Code . . . shall be copyrighted in the name of the State of
Georgia . . . [and] [t]he copyrights shall cover all copyrightable parts of the Code.’”
(alterations and omissions in original)); see also Johnson, supra note 17, at 602 (“Georgia has
argued that it is not restricting the distribution of the plain statutory text, which it maintains
people are free to copy.”).
45 Public.Resource.Org, 906 F.3d at 1235; see also Frohock, supra note 25, at 1274–76
(summarizing the litigation in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia).
46 Public.Resource.Org, 906 F.3d at 1235.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d 1352, 1354 (N.D.
Ga. 2017).
50 Id. at 1356.
51 Id. at 1356–57. The court also rejected PRO’s fair use defense. Id. at 1357–61. PRO was
enjoined from all unauthorized use of the O.C.G.A. and ordered to remove all versions of it
from PRO’s website. Id.
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not part of the law and were provided for purposes of convenience.52
The Eleventh Circuit further acknowledged that “[l]aws passed
during each session of the Georgia General Assembly that reenact
the [Code] . . . similarly provide that the annotations . . . ‘are not
enacted as statutes.’”53
The Eleventh Circuit, however, found the “merger” language in
O.C.G.A. § 1-1-1 to be crucial,54 concluding that the annotations
were law-like and “that the People [were] the ultimate authors of
the annotations.”55 In so concluding, the court carefully avoided
holding that the annotations have the force of law. Rather, the court
placed them in “a zone of indeterminacy at the frontier between
edicts that carry the force of law and those that do not.”56 The
annotations are part and parcel of the law, “so enmeshed with
Georgia’s law as to be inextricable.”57 As such, the annotations were
“inherently public domain material” and could not be protected by
copyright.58
In reaching this conclusion, the court focused on three
independent but overlapping factors: (1) “the identity of the public
officials who created the work”; (2) “the authoritativeness of the
work”; and (3) “the process by which the work was created.”59

52 Public.Resource.Org, 906 F.3d at 1233 (“Despite the fact that they are part of the official
Code, Georgia law says that the annotations themselves do not have the force of law in the
way that the statutory portions of the Code do.”); see also O.C.G.A. § 1-1-7 (2019) (providing
that the annotations “do not constitute part of the law,” do not “limit or expand the
construction of any Code section,” and are provided solely “for the purpose of convenient
reference”).
53 Public.Resource.Org, 906 F.3d at 1233–34.
54 O.C.G.A. § 1-1-1 (2019) provides that “[t]he statutory portion of . . . [the codification of
Georgia laws] shall be merged with annotations, captions, catchlines, history lines, editorial
notes, cross-references, indices, title and chapter analyses, and other materials . . . and may
be cited as the ‘Official Code of Georgia Annotated.’” (emphasis added). At the same time,
O.C.G.A. § 1-1-7 (2019) states that “[a]ll historical citations, title and chapter analyses, and
notes set out in this Code are given for the purpose of convenient reference and do not
constitute part of the law.”
55 Public.Resource.Org, 906 F.3d at 1233.
56 Id. at 1242.
57 Id. at 1243.
58 Id. at 1233. Given its decision regarding copyrightability, the court had “no occasion to
address the parties’ other arguments regarding originality and fair use.” Id. The U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari on June 24, 2019. See Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc.,
139 S. Ct. 2746 (June 24, 2019) (No. 18-1150).
59 Public.Resource.Org, 906 F.3d at 1232, 1243–54; see also Street & Hansen, supra note
1, at 223–26 (discussing the Public.Resource.Org litigation); Frohock, supra note 25, at 1281–
83 (discussing the Eleventh Circuit decision).
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A. CONSTRUCTIVE AUTHORSHIP AND THE IDENTITY OF THE PUBLIC
OFFICIALS WHO CREATED THE WORK—WHETHER THE ULTIMATE
AUTHOR OF THE ANNOTATIONS AND ANALYSES IS THE PUBLIC AT
LARGE

Notwithstanding the important roles played by the Code
Revision Commission, the Office of Legislative Counsel, and the
Georgia General Assembly in the creation of the O.C.G.A., the
Eleventh Circuit was wrong to treat the public at large as the
authors of the annotations, analyses, and commentary that are
included with the Code’s statutory portion. Rather, third parties—
namely, employees of LexisNexis and formerly Michie, acting in the
course of their employment—prepared the annotations, analyses,
and commentary for Georgia.60 Accordingly, under the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of §§ 101 and 201 of the Copyright Act,
LexisNexis would be the copyright owner but for its agreement with
Georgia.61 No court has ever held nonbinding annotations and
commentary to be unprotectable.62 In fact, the Eleventh Circuit
itself recognized “that annotations created by a private party
generally can be copyrighted because the annotations are an
original work created by a private publisher.”63
In finding constructive authorship, the Eleventh Circuit placed
too much weight on the role of the Code Revision Commission and
the Georgia legislature in the production of the annotations created
by Michie and LexisNexis.64 The metaphysical concept of “citizen
authorship”—that the “people” are the authors of the law—works
when text, even when initially drafted by a private party, is adopted
60 See Brief of the States, supra note 16, at 1 (explaining that official annotated codes are
generally created “by third-party annotators who recoup the costs of preparing those codes
by selling the official annotated codes and pocketing the revenues of those sales”).
61 See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 752 (1989) (rejecting the
“right to control the product” and “actual control” tests and instead applying common law
agency principles to determine whether an employee is acting within the course of his
employment).
62 See, e.g., STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., REP. ON COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION 28–29, 36 (Comm. Print 1961)
(reviewing nineteenth century case law and finding that “material prepared for [s]tate
[g]overnments by their employees, notably the headnotes, syllabi, [and]
annotations . . . [were] held copyrightable on behalf of the [s]tates”).
63 Public.Resource.Org, 906 F.3d at 1232.
64 Notably, “[t]he Eleventh Circuit’s analysis of the role the Commission plays and the
analysis of the adoption of the annotations diverges from accounts of members of the
Commission and those active in the creation of the Commission.” Holland, supra note 28, at
128.
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as law by the body politic.65 But this concept should not be extended
to situations in which the enacting legislative body explicitly states
that third-party annotations are not part of the statutes.
Recognizing that the Code Revision Commission, like the Office
of Legislative Council, is a creation as well as an adjunct of the
General Assembly,66 does not compel the conclusion that the
sovereign is the author of the annotations and commentary.
Instead, the employees of LexisNexis are the authors; they aid and
assist the Code Revision Commission and the Legislative Counsel.67
Under the Copyright Office’s internal manual, “[a] work that does
not constitute a government edict may be registered” for copyright,
even if it was written by a government official or employee “while
acting within the course of his or her official duties.”68 Accordingly,
annotations and other similar works—which are not government
edicts and are prepared by LexisNexis employees within the scope
of their employment pursuant to the agreement with the Code
Commission—are protectable works that can be registered with the
Copyright Office.
The ultimate authority that the Code Commission and the
General Assembly exercise over the work of LexisNexis69—such as
supervising the preparation of the annotations and commentary,
including them in the Official Code, giving them the imprimatur of
the sovereign, and specifying other details for the Code—would all
weigh heavily in Georgia’s favor in the event of a dispute with
LexisNexis over copyright ownership.70 This is because the
65 For example, the First Circuit found that a model building code, initially drafted by a
private party, entered into the public domain and became uncopyrightable once incorporated
into the official Massachusetts building code. See Public.Resource.Org, 906 F.3d at 1241
(citing Bldg. Officials & Code Adm’rs v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730 (1st Cir. 1980)).
66 See id. at 1245 (“The Commission is . . . the ‘alter ego’ of the General Assembly” because
“its staff, funding, and responsibilities all fall under the legislative umbrella.”).
67 The Eleventh Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court both acknowledge that that “it is
literally impossible, in view of the complexities of modern legislative processes[,] . . . for
[elected legislators] to perform their legislative tasks without the help of aides and
assistants . . . .” Id. (first omission in original) (quoting Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606,
616–17 (1972)).
68 COPYRIGHT OFFICE COMPENDIUM, supra note 4, § 313.6(C)(2).
69 It is undeniable that the State of Georgia and the Code Revision Commission, on behalf
of the Georgia General Assembly, have the ultimate authority over the work of LexisNexis
and the enactment of the statutory portion of the O.C.G.A. See Code Revision Comm’n v.
Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d 1352, 1353–54 (N.D. Ga. 2017) (outlining the
relationship between Georgia and LexisNexis as described in the publication agreement).
70 See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 (1989) (“In determining
whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law of agency, we consider
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commissioning entity’s actual control over the method and means
by which a work is accomplished is an important factor in
determining copyright ownership under “work made for hire”
jurisprudence.71 Of course, LexisNexis is not claiming copyright
ownership as an independent contractor. Instead, like Michie in the
early 1980s, it has agreed—by contract and force of the enabling
statute—that copyright ownership of the O.C.G.A. lies with
Georgia.72 And while Georgia’s authority and supervision over
LexisNexis during the publication of the O.C.G.A. might provide
Georgia with a better claim to authorship of the creative materials
included therein, that authorship does not flow to the public at
large.
Similarly, the enactment of the O.C.G.A. pursuant to the Georgia
Constitution, through bicameralism and presentment to the
Governor for signature or veto, does not make the public at large
constructive authors of the annotated Code. After all, this
legislation specifically provides that the creative material included
in the Code does not limit or expand the statutory construction of
the Code in any way and that “[a]ll historical citations, title and
chapter analyses, and notes set out in [the] Code are given for the
purpose of convenient reference and do not constitute part of the
law.”73 The Eleventh Circuit should not have disregarded this
statutory language and downplayed authorship by the LexisNexis
employees.
B. THE AUTHORITATIVENESS OF THE ANNOTATIONS

By describing the annotations as “law-like,” the Eleventh Circuit
mischaracterized the authoritativeness of the annotations. The
court’s discussion of copyright’s approach to public edicts is treatise
worthy, beginning with the Supreme Court’s decision in Wheaton
the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by which the product is
accomplished.”).
71 See id. (identifying a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider in determining whether
a person qualifies as an employee or an independent contractor). There are, of course, other
factors which must be weighed; thus, the right to control is important but not necessarily
dispositive. See, e.g., JOYCE ET AL., supra note 1, at 270–71 n.6 (questioning which factors, if
any, should be given more weight in the “work made for hire” analysis).
72 See supra notes 31–44 and accompanying text.
73 O.C.G.A. § 1-1-7 (2019) (emphasis added); see also Brief of the States, supra note 16, at
3–10 (“The annotation of a case is not an exercise of popular sovereignty, but a comment on
it, and the original work of authorship of the company or body that wrote it.”).
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v. Peters, in which the Court held that its own written opinions were
not copyrightable but did not squarely state that law in general was
excluded from protection.74 The Eleventh Circuit finished its
discussion with two circuit court decisions involving copyrightable
model building codes that were written by private entities and later
enacted as statutes.75 Sandwiched between these bookends is an
extensive analysis of Banks v. Manchester, in which the U.S.
Supreme Court extended its holding in Wheaton to decisions written
by state court judges.76 Specifically, the court noted that Banks
established that statutes and judicial opinions are “attributable to
the constructive authorship of the People” and thus are not
copyrightable.”77 The court went on to state that
[t]his does not mean that statutes, judicial opinions, and
other texts that carry the clear force of law are the only
works that may be subject to the [Banks] rule. For one
thing, relying, as the district court did, on a bright line
distinction between edicts that have the force of law and
those that do not . . . simply does not work in some
cases. This is one of them. It is clear to us that there
exists a zone of indeterminacy at the frontier between
edicts that carry the force of law and those that do not.
In this small band of cases a government work may not
be characterized as law, and yet still be so sufficiently
law-like as to implicate the core policy interests
undergirding Banks.78
The court ultimately concluded that the annotations and other
analyses in the O.C.G.A. are law-like, notwithstanding the Georgia
General Assembly’s clear statements to the contrary in the enabling
legislation and thereafter.79 This was an unprecedented leap. Prior
74 Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d 1229, 1237 (11th Cir.
2018) (citing Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834)).
75 See id. at 1240–42 (first citing Bldg. Officials & Code Adm’rs v. Code Tech., Inc., 628
F.2d 730 (1st Cir. 1980); then citing Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791 (5th
Cir. 2002)).
76 Id. at 1237 (citing Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888)).
77 In Banks, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the copyright on the opinions of the Ohio
Supreme Court was invalid. See Banks, 128 U.S. at 252; see also Public.Resource.Org, 906
F.3d at 1242.
78 Public.Resource.Org, 906 F.3d at 1242 (internal citations omitted).
79 Id. at 1243.
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to the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, there was no “zone of
indeterminacy” about annotations to judicial decisions and statutes.
While building codes, standards, classification systems, and other
materials referenced in, or incorporated in, statutes and ordinances
had caused problems for the courts throughout the years,
annotations to statutes and judicial opinions had not.80
To support its statement about this zone of indeterminacy, the
court cited Jean v. Nelson.81 Jean was not a copyright infringement
decision, but rather involved a challenge to a policy change by the
Immigration & Naturalization Service (INS) regarding the
detention of aliens.82 The INS, in changing its policy, did not follow
notice-and-comment
rulemaking
procedures,
which
the
immigrant-plaintiffs asserted were required by the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) because the change in policy constituted a
“rule.”83 The district court agreed and ordered the release of about
one thousand Haitians who were held in detention at their point of
entry.84
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed that recourse to
notice-and-comment rulemaking under § 553(c) of the APA was
required because the new policy constituted a “rule” under APA
§ 551(4) and did not fall under the “general statement of policy”
exemption in APA § 553(b)(A).85 To determine the scope of the
“general statement of policy” exemption, the court asked whether
the agency’s pronouncement was treated by the agency as a binding
norm.86 If so, then it was deemed a rule that had to be promulgated
through notice-and-comment rulemaking.87 The court found that

80 See Petitioners’ Reply Brief, supra note 9, at 5–7 (explaining the recognition from the
Copyright Office and the Supreme Court that annotations may be copyrighted); infra notes
92–108 and accompanying text.
81 Public.Resource.Org, 906 F.3d at 1242 (citing Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1480–83
(11th Cir. 1983), on reh’g, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984), aff’d, 472 U.S. 846 (1985)).
82 See Jean, 711 F.2d at 1462 (“Pursuant to the new policy[,] Haitians were detained in
camps or prisons pending a final determination of their right to remain in this country . . . .”).
83 Id. at 1463, 1474.
84 Id. at 1462.
85 Id. at 1462, 1478.
86 Id. at 1481–82.
87 Id. at 1482–83 (“If an agency, or its official, is bound to apply an airtight rule in a given
case[,] it is important to allow specific objections prior to promulgation . . . .”).
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the new INS policy clearly established a binding norm on agency
personnel.88
Distinctions between legislative rules, interpretative rules, and
general statements of policy have vexed courts and commentators
for many years because the differences are fuzzy, blurred, baffling,
and enshrouded in smog.89 If a court determines that an agency’s
guidance document does not fit within one of the APA’s rulemaking
exceptions—for example, the “general statement of policy”
exemption—the agency is sent back to the drawing board to
promulgate the rule appropriately.90 In other words, if an agency is
treating the “government work” like a law, then it should have been
promulgated properly.
This proposition does not, however, support PRO’s contention
and the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that the O.C.G.A.’s
non-statutory annotations and commentary are not copyrightable
because they are law-like. As previously explained, the Georgia
General Assembly has made it abundantly clear that these
materials are not part of the Code that it enacts.91 The annotations
do not create binding norms because they lack the force of law.
The difficult cases for copyright law’s edicts of government
doctrine involve privately developed materials, like building and
zoning codes, technical standards, and guidelines which have been
referenced in, or incorporated in, statutes or ordinances.92 It is fair
88 See id. (“A broad rule of detention with undefined exceptions is susceptible to rigid
enforcement with no opportunity to avoid the rule’s harsh results. Such a rule cannot be a
general statement of policy; in truth it creates a binding norm.” (footnote omitted)).
89 See, e.g., WILLIAM FUNK & RICHARD SEAMON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: EXAMPLES &
EXPLANATIONS 167–68 (3d ed. 2009) (explaining that the distinction between legislative rules
and interpretative rules is blurry and baffling and that general statements of policy often
look like interpretative rules).
90 See, e.g., Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 139 S. Ct. 1804, 1811 (2019) (invalidating a
change in the reimbursement formula under the Medicare Act that was adopted without
providing affected parties with notice and an opportunity to comment).
91 See supra notes 52–58 and accompanying text.
92 See, e.g., John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant Props., Inc., 322 F.3d 26, 38 (1st
Cir. 2003) (explaining that references to architectural drawings in a local government’s
re-zoning decision did not “thrust the drawings themselves into the public domain”); Veeck v.
S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 793 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[A]s law, the model codes
enter the public domain and are not subject to the copyright holder’s exclusive prerogatives.
As model codes, however, the organization’s works retain their protected status.”); Cty. of
Suffolk v. First Am. Real Estate Sols., 261 F.3d 179, 195 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding copyright
protection for government-created tax maps that clarify residents’ duty to pay taxes); Practice
Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516, 518–20 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the
adoption by federal regulations of a third party’s uniform classification system for medical
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to say that these difficult cases fall into a zone of indeterminacy.
Notably, though, they do not, involve annotations accompanying
statutes or judicial decisions.
John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant Properties, Inc. is
illustrative.93 This case involved copyrighted architectural plans
and drawings for a failed condominium project that the plaintiff
architect had drafted for the project’s developer.94 These plans and
drawings were used without permission by a second developer for
another condominium project at the same location.95 The jury
returned a $1.3 million verdict for the plaintiff-architect.96 A crucial
issue on appeal was the trial court’s rejection of the second
developer’s defense that the plans and drawings, by being included
in a restrictive covenant sought by the first developer and approved
at a town meeting in connection with a zoning change, thereby
entered the public domain and lost copyright protection.97
The First Circuit acknowledged the difficulty in determining the
public domain status of material that does not fall neatly into the
categories of statutes and judicial opinions and that judicial
decisions on these cases were inconsistent.98 Nevertheless, it
declined to consider the broad question of copyright protection for
codes and other materials that were written by private parties and
were referenced in, or incorporated in, codes or ordinances enacted
by a governmental entity.99 Instead, it distinguished restrictive
covenants from zoning ordinances. Rezoning a property from
residential use to mixed use simply sets new parameters for the
procedures did not render that code uncopyrightable); CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean
Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that the incorporation of
used car valuations in insurance laws did not make those valuations uncopyrightable because
they represented the editors’ predictions “based on a wide variety of informational sources
and . . . professional judgment,” rather than simply communicating "pre-existing facts that
had merely been discovered by the . . . editors”); Street & Hansen, supra note 1, at 226–33
(discussing several cases involving privately developed content that was incorporated in or
referenced by binding law).
93 322 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2003).
94 Id. at 30.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 38.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 39. The court discussed its decision in Building Officials & Code Administrators
v. Code Technology, Inc., 628 F.2d 730 (1st Cir. 1980), where the court declined to decide
whether a properly promulgated regulation that incorporated a private party’s copyrighted
material thereby invalidated the copyright on that material. See John G. Danielson, Inc., 322
F.3d at 39.
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development of a particular site.100 In contrast, the approval at a
town meeting of a restrictive covenant for a project in a particular
zone was an agreement between the town and the developer
concerning that site.101 That agreement, which incorporated the
architect’s copyrighted plans and drawings, was not equivalent to a
statute or code.102 The copyrighted works were not part of any
generally applicable laws and were not placed in the public domain
solely by virtue of their approval at the town meeting as part of a
restrictive covenant.103
In short, the First Circuit decided that mere reference to a
copyrighted drawing or plan in a planning board decision or in
speeches at a town meeting did not place those works in the public
domain any more than quoting a protected poem on the floor of the
Senate would strip that poem of its copyright.104 Courts continue to
struggle, however, in determining whether and at what point
otherwise copyrightable works lose protection when adopted by a
government body. In contrast, the copyrightability of annotations
and commentary accompanying statutes and judicial decisions has
been settled since the end of the nineteenth century.105
The annotations and analyses are part of the Official Code of
Georgia and, as stated in O.C.G.A. § 1-1-1, are merged with the
statutory portion of the Code. This does not, however, cast a shadow
of authority over the annotations as suggested by the Eleventh
Circuit.106 To the contrary, the General Assembly makes clear
repeatedly in the enabling statute and elsewhere that the
John G. Danielson, Inc., 322 F.3d at 39.
Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 40.
104 Id.
105 See, e.g., Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 647 (1888) (holding that government officials
have a right to copyright their own works); Howell v. Miller, 91 F. 129, 138 (6th Cir. 1898)
(recognizing copyright protection for annotations in a code book that Michigan law mandated
be treated as if published under authority of the state); Petitioners’ Reply Brief, supra note
9, at 9–10 (noting the Georgia Supreme Court’s determination that the inclusion of
annotations in an official Code does not provide such annotations with legal force (citing
Harrison Co. v. Code Revision Comm’n, 260 S.E.2d 30 (Ga. 1979)). Interestingly, in Matthew
Bender & Co. v. West Publishing Co., 158 F.3d 674 (2d Cir. 1998), Hyperlaw did not include
West’s copyrighted headnotes and syllabi in its publication of West’s judicial opinions, as they
were undoubtedly protected by West’s copyright. Id. at 676–77. The court, however,
determined that West’s copyright did not extend to unoriginal content, including parallel
citations, captions, courts, date information, and attorney information. Id.
106 See Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d 1229, 1249–50 (11th
Cir. 2018).
100
101
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annotations and analyses are distinct from the statutory portion
and are not law.107 Accordingly, they are protected by copyright,
while the underlying statutory provisions are not.108 This is
consistent with the long-settled distinction in the government edicts
doctrine between the public domain status of judicial opinions and
statutes and affording copyright protection to annotations.
C. THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN GEORGIA

The Eleventh Circuit explained that the process by which the
annotations were enacted by the General Assembly, along with the
statutory portion of the O.C.G.A., “is similar to the ordinary process
by which laws are enacted”—bicameral passage and presentment to
the Governor.109 It “depict[s] a [Code Revision] Commission that
intensely exercises its authority to control the annotations.”110 In
essence, the involvement of state employees and the General
Assembly, giving the O.C.G.A. its final approval and imprimatur, is
more than a seal of approval; it is direct involvement in the creation
of the O.C.G.A.111
In reality, the Eleventh Circuit legislated to give the
“annotations [law-like] authority without a legislator, outside of
members in the Commission, having ever read the text.”112 In fact,
Terry McKenzie, who worked with the General Assembly at the
time of the Code Revision Commission’s creation, “stressed [that]
the General Assembly has never voted on a case annotation.”113
Michie, the first publisher of the official annotated Code, initially
prepared an unannotated compilation of Georgia’s statutes under
See supra notes 52–58 and accompanying text.
The annotations included in the Georgia Code are analogous to the Advisory Notes
accompanying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the sense that lawyers turn to them
for guidance in formulating arguments on how code provisions or rules should be interpreted
and applied. But neither the annotations nor the Advisory Notes carry the force of law. Cf.
Public.Resource.Org, 906 F.3d at 1250–51.
109 Id. at 1252–54.
110 Holland, supra note 28, at 128. After all, as the Eleventh Circuit notes, the O.C.G.A.
contract and guidelines received legislative approval, the commission that supervises
LexisNexis in producing the O.C.G.A. is composed mostly of legislators, and the General
Assembly votes on whether to approve it as the official codification of the state’s laws.
Public.Resource.Org, 906 F.3d at 1252–53.
111 Jahner, supra note 15 (quoting Elizabeth Rader, counsel for PRO, who posits that “[t]he
state has the ultimate right to approve or disapprove” the annotations).
112 Holland, supra note 28, at 128.
113 Id.; see also Terry McKenzie, The Making of a New Code, 18 GA. ST. B.J. 102, 102 (1982)
(“These unofficial codes were not enacted by the General Assembly.”).
107
108
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the Code Commission’s supervision.114 That compilation was then
adopted as the official code by the General Assembly.115 At this
point, Michie annotated the Code, including “summaries of judicial
decisions and Georgia Attorney General opinions interpreting or
applying statutory provisions.”116 In the almost forty years since the
O.C.G.A.’s enactment, the General Assembly’s approach has not
varied—it has never reviewed or voted on individual annotations.117
Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 1-1-1, the General Assembly has always
distinguished between the statutory portions of the Code and the
annotations, which do not have the effect of statutes.118 Moreover,
O.C.G.A. § 1-1-7 emphasizes that the notes, chapter analyses, and
historical citations in the Code “are given for the purpose of
convenient reference and do not constitute part of the law.”119 In
short, the court overstated the Georgia General Assembly’s
contribution to and approval of the annotations.120
IV. LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE “MERGER” OF CODIFIED STATUTES
WITH ANNOTATIONS AND CHAPTER ANALYSES UNDER O.C.G.A.
§ 1-1-1
Section 1-1-1 of the Georgia Code provides that “[t]he statutory
portion of the codification of Georgia laws prepared by the Code
Revision Commission . . . shall have the effect of statutes enacted by
the General Assembly” and that it “shall be merged with
annotations, captions, . . . chapter analyses, and other materials”
and “published by authority of the state.”121 While hindsight is often
20/20, perhaps the Georgia General Assembly should have said
something like ‘the statutory portion of such codification shall be
included alongside the annotations,’ instead of using “merged.”122

McKenzie, supra note 113, at 103.
Id. (explaining that after reviewing the unannotated compilation of Georgia’s statutes
Michie prepared a manuscript—the Code of Georgia 1981 Legislative Edition—that was
enacted by the General Assembly).
116 Georgia’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 22, at 6; see also McKenzie, supra
note 113, at 103–06.
117 Georgia’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 22, at 7.
118 See supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text.
119 O.C.G.A. § 1-1-7 (2019) (emphasis added).
120 See Jahner, supra note 15 (quoting Georgia attorney Joshua Johnson).
121 O.C.G.A. § 1-1-1 (2019) (emphasis added).
122 See, e.g., Holland, supra note 28, at 129–30 (suggesting that the merging clause of
O.C.G.A. § 1-1-1 should be amended to clarify and remove the authority of the annotations).
114
115
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That might have better reflected the legislature’s intent that the
annotations, analyses, and commentary are not law but merely
explanations of portions of the Code.123 That alternative language
also might have allowed courts and commentators to avoid dealing
with the copyright jurisprudence associated with how an
unprotectable idea and an author’s expression of that idea can
sometimes merge.124
Nevertheless, the General Assembly used “merger” language in
§ 1-1-1, and the Eleventh Circuit felt that this language rendered
the annotations unprotectable by the state’s copyright on the
O.C.G.A.125 It emphasized that the legislature’s decision to “merge”
the annotations with the statutes created a unified whole, imbuing
the annotations with “an official legislative quality.”126 This gave
the annotations authoritative weight and supported the court’s
determination that they are “attributable to the constructive
authorship of the People.”127
Although “most official codes are not annotated and most
annotated codes are not official,”128 the fact that Georgia’s official
statutory provisions are “merged” with the code’s annotations does
not transform the annotations into law and make them
uncopyrightable. The contention that this merger makes the
annotations law or law-like is explicitly contradicted by another
section of the Code, which states that the headings, annotations,
and descriptions
do not constitute part of the law and shall in no manner
limit or expand the construction of any Code section. All
historical citations, title and chapter analyses, and
notes set out in this Code are given for the purpose of
convenient reference and do not constitute part of the
law.129

Id.
See infra notes 135–36 and accompanying text.
125 Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d 1229, 1233 (11th Cir.
2018).
126 Id. at 1249.
127 Id. at 1252.
128 Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d 1352, 1356 (N.D.
Ga. 2017).
129 O.C.G.A. § 1-1-7 (2019) (emphases added).
123
124

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol54/iss1/4

22

Shipley: Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.Org and the Fight Ove

2019]

THE FIGHT OVER COPYRIGHT PROTECTION

133

The General Assembly thus made clear distinctions between the
officially enacted statutory portions of the code and the annotations,
analyses, and commentary. As the district court explained, “[t]he
entire O.C.G.A. is not enacted into law by the Georgia legislature
and does not have the force of law.”130
This is also shown by the legislature’s action to tidy up the new
comprehensive code through a 1984 “housekeeping act,”131 which
was drafted
[t]o amend the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, so as
to correct typographical, stylistic, and other errors and
omissions in the Official Code of Georgia Annotated and
in Acts of the General Assembly amending the Official
Code of Georgia Annotated; to reenact the statutory
portion of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, as
amended; [and] to provide for necessary or appropriate
revisions and modernizations of matters contained in
the Official Code of Georgia Annotated.132
It is the statutory portion of the O.C.G.A. that was reenacted
with this housekeeping bill, not the other material contained within
the O.C.G.A.133 Thus, the Georgia legislature did not inadvertently
enact the annotations and other creative additions as law by
merging them with the statutory provisions.134
PRO argued in the district court that copyright law’s merger
doctrine blocked protection for the annotations because there are a
very limited number of ways to explain the ideas or concepts they
express.135 The district court, however, rejected this argument,
explaining that
[t]he mere fact that the judicial summaries in the
O.C.G.A. are distinctly different from corresponding
annotations in West’s Code Annotated belies the

Public.Resource.Org, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 1356.
See Axson v. State, 329 S.E.2d 566, 567 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (“In 1984, one of the first
acts of the General Assembly was an extensive tidying up of the comprehensive new Code
which had been adopted previously.”), overruled by Dudley v. State, 542 S.E.2d 99 (Ga. 2001).
132 H.B. 1156, 137th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1984) (emphasis added).
133 Id.
134 Public.Resource.Org, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 1356.
135 Holland, supra note 28, at 119.
130
131
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applicability of the merger doctrine. There is no
question that there are a multitude of ways to write a
paragraph summarizing a judicial decision, and
further, a multitude of ways to compile the different
annotations throughout the O.C.G.A. Therefore, the
Court finds that the merger doctrine is inapplicable
here.136
A related issue was litigated in Georgia v. Harrison Co.137 After
the Harrison Company published an unofficial version of the
Georgia Code, the state brought suit against the Harrison Company
for copyright infringement.138 To resolve this dispute, the court had
to determine what was included in the “statutory portion”—namely,
whether the unprotectable statutes included title, chapter, and
article headings.139 The court quoted the Code’s provision about the
statutory portion being merged with annotations and other
specifically listed items, writing “[s]ince no reference is made . . . to
the title, chapter, and article headings it may be that the General
Assembly assumed that such matters were part of the statutory
portion,” and thus were in the public domain unprotected by
copyright.140 The court further stated that even if title, chapter, and
article headings were not included in the statutory portion of the
Code, they would still not be afforded copyright protection because
of the policy of denying protection to descriptive words and short
phrases.141 Hence, title and chapter headings were not protected by
the state’s copyright on the O.C.G.A. and could be reproduced by the
Harrison Company in its unofficial version of the Code.142 On the
136 Public.Resource.Org, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 1357. Due to the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling that
the annotations were in the public domain and were uncopyrightable, it did not reach the
parties’ arguments about originality—including the merger doctrine—and fair use. See Code
Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d 1229, 1233 (11th Cir. 2018); but see
Frohock, supra note 25, at 1283–99 (defending the Eleventh Circuit’s decision and asserting
that the same outcome could be reached by recognizing that the law, along with the law-like
annotations, is not copyrightable because the law’s idea and its official expression have
merged).
137 548 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ga. 1982); see also Johnson, supra note 17, at 602–03.
138 Harrison Co., 548 F. Supp. at 113.
139 Id. at 115.
140 Id.
141 Id.; see also JOYCE ET AL., supra note 1, at 99 n.5.
142 Harrison Co., 548 F. Supp. at 115–16. The court additionally could have said that these
headings were inextricably intertwined with the statutory portion of the Code and thus
unprotectable. See supra notes 105–108 and accompanying text. Affording copyright
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other hand, the implication of these statements is that the items
specifically listed in O.C.G.A. § 1-1-1 as merging with the statutory
portion are copyrightable. Those listed items include annotations,
history lines, editorial notes, and title and chapter analyses.143
The contention that the statutory portion of Code merged with
the annotations and analyses is also directly at odds with the
venerable decision of Howell v. Miller,144 which upheld copyright on
the annotations for Michigan’s statutes. There, the court stated that
[i]t was suggested in argument that no one can obtain
the exclusive right to publish the laws of a state in a
book prepared by him. This general proposition cannot
be doubted. And it may also be said that any person
desiring to publish the statutes of a state may use any
copy of such statutes to be found in any printed book,
whether such book be the property of the state or the
property of an individual. If Miller had cut from
Howell’s books, delivered to him by the state, the
general laws of Michigan as therein printed, and the
pages so cut out had been used when his compilation
was printed,—if this had been done, and nothing
more,—there would have been no ground of complaint.
But it is said that he did more than this, and that he
appropriated such parts of Howell’s books as were the
result of the latter’s labor and industry.145

protection to these headings also would have resurrected the discredited “sweat of the brow”
doctrine because it would have essentially protected factual matters that can only be
expressed in a limited number of ways. See, e.g., Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co.,
158 F.3d 693, 699 (2d Cir. 1998) (explaining the U.S. Supreme Court’s rejection of the “sweat
of the brow” doctrine, which would provide copyright protection “to the facts and other
non-original elements of compilations on the basis of the labor invested in obtaining and
organizing the information”); JOYCE ET AL., supra note 1, at 251–52.
143 O.C.G.A. § 1-1-1 (2019); see also O.C.G.A. § 1-1-7 (2019) (“All historical citations, title
and chapter analyses, and notes set out in this Code are given for the purpose of convenient
reference and do not constitute part of the law.”)
144 91 F. 129 (6th Cir. 1898).
145 Id. at 137–38. The court stated that Howell’s copyright “include[d] marginal references,
notes, memoranda, table of contents, indexes, and digests of judicial decisions prepared by
him from original sources of information” as well as the “headnotes . . . [that were] clearly the
result of his labors.” Id. at 138. The court had no “difficulty in holding that his copyright
would embrace all such matters, for they constitute no part of that which is public property,
and are plainly produced by the compiler.” Id.
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This is exactly what PRO did. It could have digitally cut and pasted
just the statutory portion of the O.C.G.A. Instead, it did much more
by scanning and reproducing the copyrighted annotations and
analyses as well.
Moreover, parsing the Code’s copyrightable elements from the
unprotected core legal text is relatively straightforward.
Distinguishing protected annotations and commentary from the
unprotected statute is not like applying Learned Hand’s
abstractions test,146 or the subtractive approach,147 to determine
what is and is not copyrightable in a literary work.148 This is largely
because the unprotected statutory text is not inextricably
intertwined or merged with the annotations and commentary.149
Copyright offers protection for the annotations against
unauthorized copying, and many decisions have “evinced a visceral
dislike” of copycats and “rip-off artists” who misappropriate the
works of others.150
In short, the Georgia General Assembly’s use of the term
“merger” in the enabling legislation for the Georgia Code Annotated
did not have the effect of constructively incorporating the
annotations and commentary into the Code’s statutory portion so
that they lost copyright protection. This is not an instance where
idea and expression merge because there are a variety of ways for
authors to annotate and provide commentary on the Code’s many
statutory provisions, and because the distinctions made by courts in
the late nineteenth century between unprotectable statutes and
146 See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (asking
“whether the part taken is ‘substantial,’ and therefore not a ‘fair use’ of the copyrighted
work”); JOYCE ET AL., supra note 1, at 676 (distinguishing between the “abstractions” test and
the “pattern” test, which extends protection to “the ‘pattern’ of the work”).
147 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 1, at 676–78 (explaining one approach to identifying
infringement that focuses on how much of a work the potential infringer did not copy).
148 Id. at 670 (“The inquiry into improper appropriation . . . remains one of the most
contentious (and, not coincidentally, least precisely delineated) exercises in all of copyright
law.”).
149 See supra notes 142–143 and accompanying text; see also Bambauer, supra note 18, at
1075–76 (explaining that merger operates only “when there are but a few ways to express an
idea” but noting that “there are generally many ways to summarize or describe a statute”);
but see Frohock, supra note 25, at 1298 (agreeing with the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that
the annotations had effectively merged with the statute and were thus taken outside of
copyright protection although acknowledging that the law “presents an unconventional
instance of merger” because “there are many ways to express the [law], which only one author
can offer”).
150 Paul Heald, Federal Intellectual Property Law and the Economics of Preemption, 76
IOWA L. REV. 959, 982 (1991).
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judicial decisions and copyrightable annotations remain viable and
relatively easy to apply.
V. SUPREMACY CLAUSE CONCERNS
The Eleventh Circuit’s disregard of the clear statements in the
O.C.G.A. by the Georgia General Assembly that the annotations
and analyses do not constitute part of the law raises federalism and
separation of powers concerns.151 After all, the court effectively
amended sections of the Georgia Code by constructively striking its
clear statements that the materials added to the unprotected
statutory portion of the Code by LexisNexis are not part of the law.
That is a double whammy; a federal court effectively amended
provisions in a state’s statutes. On the other hand, perhaps this
judicial intervention can be justified under the Supremacy Clause
of the U.S. Constitution.152 The argument might be that the
pertinent provisions in the Georgia Code, stating that the
annotations are not part of the law and providing that Georgia holds
the copyright on the O.C.G.A., are preempted under the Supremacy
Clause. By claiming copyright protection for the annotations and
analyses, Georgia is arguably frustrating the objectives of the
Copyright Act specifically and copyright policy generally.153 Even
though it is difficult to derive a preemption argument from the
Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Public.Resource.Org, here is how it
might look.
The preemption doctrine, derived from the Supremacy Clause,
nullifies a state statute or common law rule that frustrates
accomplishing the objectives of an act of Congress.154 Preemption
occurs when “either . . . the nature of the regulated subject matter

See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 1-1-7 (2019).
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the laws of the United
States . . . shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges, in every State, shall be bound
thereby, any thing [sic] in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding.”).
153 See generally David E. Shipley, Refusing to Rock the Boat: The Sears/Compco
Preemption Doctrine Applied to Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 385,
386–91 (1990) (discussing when federal preemption applies to state intellectual property
laws); see also Bambauer, supra note 18, at 1076–77 (suggesting that preemption “could erase
some noxious aspects” of state enforcement of the copyrights in their annotated codes).
154 See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66–67 (1941) (analyzing whether a state law
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress”).
151
152
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permits no other conclusion, or . . . Congress has unmistakably so
ordained.”155 Because Congress has enacted a comprehensive
copyright statute,156 pursuant to a clear grant in the Constitution,157
it is not surprising that state laws regulating certain kinds of
intellectual property have been preempted because they conflict
with it.158
The U.S. Supreme Court has found state copyright laws
preempted when they “interfere with the federal policy . . . of
allowing free access to copy whatever the . . . copyright laws leave
in the public domain”159 and explained that “a [s]tate may not, when
the article is . . . uncopyrighted, prohibit the copying of the article
itself or award damages for such copying.”160 The Court also has
acknowledged that preemption might occur “if a [s]tate attempted
to protect that which Congress intended to be free from restraint.”161
Moreover, its “historic copyright jurisprudence [has] emphasize[d]
the public purposes embodied in the Copyright Clause instead of
focusing on the proprietary interests of authors [and] copyright
owners.”162
PRO, in relying on these statements, could argue that Georgia’s
copyright claim in the O.C.G.A.—which is based on its contract with
LexisNexis, and the statutes that created the Code Revision
Commission and authorized the revision of the Code in coordination
with a publisher—contravenes federal copyright policy and the
Copyright Act by extending protection to materials that are in the
public domain.163 Of course, this argument depends upon
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (2012).
157 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress power “[t]o promote the progress of science
and useful arts, by securing, for limited times, to authors and investors, the exclusive right
to their respective writings and discoveries”).
158 See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989)
(holding that a Florida patent-related statute was preempted because it conflicted with
federal goals of competitive markets). But see Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 546 (1973)
(holding that the U.S. Constitution “does not expressly or by inference vest all power to grant
copyright protection exclusively in the [f]ederal [g]overnment” (emphasis added)).
159 Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964).
160 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232–33 (1964).
161 See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 559.
162 David E. Shipley, Congressional Authority Over Intellectual Property Policy After Eldred
v. Ashcroft: Deference, Empty Limitations, and Risks to the Public Domain, 70 ALB. L. REV.
1255, 1257 (2007).
163 Cf. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33–34 (2003)
(explaining that Dastar had an unfettered right to copy and use an original television series
because the copyright on that series had expired and was thus in the public domain).
155
156
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acceptance of the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that “no valid
copyright interest can be asserted in any part of the [O.C.G.A.],”
including the accompanying annotations, because it represents “the
sovereign expression of the People by their legislature.”164 In
essence, Georgia’s enforcement of its claimed copyright in the
O.C.G.A.’s annotations is analogous to Florida’s unsuccessful
attempt by statute to protect boat hull designs, unprotected by
patent or copyright, against reproduction through a direct molding
process.165 Similarly, the Supreme Court was unwilling to allow
Twentieth Century Fox to assert an unfair competition claim under
§ 43(a) of the Lanham Act against Dastar Corporation for using
Fox’s television series about World War II that had fallen into the
public domain because doing so would conflict with copyright law.166
The Court said that to allow a cause of action under § 43(a) “would
create a species of mutant copyright law that limits the public’s
‘federal right to copy and use’ expired copyrights.”167 In short,
everyone has a right to copy and use materials in the public domain,
so Georgia’s copyright infringement claim is preempted because the
O.C.G.A. is in the public domain.
The problem with this preemption argument—and the central
thesis of this Article—is that the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion and
underlying rationale is seriously flawed. The distinction between
the public domain status of statutes and judicial opinions, and the
copyrightability of annotations and headnotes, has received
long-standing recognition by courts and the Copyright Office.168 In
addition, Congress has not acted to change this dichotomy since it
was first recognized.169 Georgia’s copyright in the annotations and
other materials added to the statutory portion of the Code by
LexisNexis does not conflict with the Copyright Act or copyright
policy. Rather, it provides an incentive to create the annotations and

164 Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th Cir.
2018).
165 See Shipley, supra note 153, at 385, 400–09.
166 See generally David E. Shipley, What Do Flexible Road Signs, Children’s Clothes and
the Allied Campaign in Europe During WWII Have in Common? The Public Domain the
Supreme Court’s Intellectual Property Jurisprudence, 13 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 57, 81–
89 (2005).
167 Dastar Corp., 539 U.S. at 34 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
489 U.S. 141, 165 (1989)).
168 See supra notes 4, 6, 131–34 and accompanying text.
169 See supra note 131–34 and accompanying text.
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analyses.170 Since these value-added materials created by
LexisNexis for Georgia are entitled to copyright protection and
support copyright policy, Georgia’s copyright infringement claim is
not preempted.
VI. CONCLUSION
The public edicts doctrine’s distinction between the public
domain status of judicial opinions and statutes, and the
copyrightability of annotations and analyses of those opinions and
statutes, has been recognized since the late nineteenth century by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Callaghan v. Myers171 and the Sixth
Circuit in Howell v. Miller.172 This distinction is still recognized by
the Copyright Office.173 The public edicts doctrine has been
somewhat difficult to apply where the material at issue—such as
privately drafted ordinances, regulations, standards, and articles
like maps or tests referenced in, or incorporated in, legislation—
“does not fall neatly into the categories of statutes or judicial
opinions.”174 Georgia’s copyright infringement claim against PRO,
however, is not one of those difficult cases. It involves the
established distinction between the unprotected statutory portion of
the Georgia Code and the annotations and analyses created by
LexisNexis.
Nevertheless,
the
Eleventh
Circuit,
while
acknowledging that they did not have the force of law, said that the
annotations and analyses in the O.C.G.A. were law-like, attempted
to distinguish past judicial decisions, and applied a novel three-step
analysis to invalidate Georgia’s copyright in the annotations.175 For
the reasons explained in this Article, the U.S. Supreme Court
should reverse the Eleventh Circuit’s erroneous invalidation of
170 Georgia’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 22, at 23 (highlighting that
LexisNexis will not want to maintain its contract with Georgia absent copyright protection
or direct compensation through taxpayer funds); Brief of the States, supra note 16, at 10–11
(“States use copyright protections to facilitate the affordable production of official annotated
codes.”); see also Bambauer, supra note 18, at 1076–77 (acknowledging problems with the
preemption argument, including that it runs counter to the Copyright Act and relevant
precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court).
171 128 U.S. 617 (1888).
172 91 F. 129 (6th Cir. 1898).
173 COPYRIGHT OFFICE COMPENDIUM, supra note 4, § 313.6(C)(2).
174 John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant Props., Inc. 322 F.3d 26, 38 (1st Cir.
2003).
175 See generally Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 606 F.3d 1229 (11th
Cir. 2018).
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Georgia’s copyright in the annotations and reinstate the district
court’s decision in favor of the Code Revision Commission and
Georgia.
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